George W. Roberts; III—Some Questions in Epistemology, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 70, Issue 1, 1 June 1970, Pages 37–60, https://doi.org/10.

The article presents the conceptual groundwork for an understanding of the essentially improvisational dimension of human rationality. It aims to clarify how we should think about important concepts pertinent to central aspects of human practices, namely, the concepts of improvisation, normativity, habit, and freedom. In order to understand the sense in which human practices are essentially improvisational, it is first necessary to criticize misconceptions about improvisation as lack of preparation and creatio ex nihilo. Second, it is necessary to solve the (...) theoretical problems that derive from misunderstandings concerning the notions of normativity, habit, and freedom – misunderstandings that revolve around the idea that rationality is a form that is developed out of itself and thus works in a way similar to algorithms. One can only make sense of normativity, habit, and freedom if one understands that they all involve conflictual relationships with the world and with others, which in turn enables one to adequately take into account their constitutive connection to improvisation, properly understood. In outlining these conceptual connections, we want to prepare the foundations for an explanation of rational practices as improvisational practices. The article concludes by stating that human rational life is improvisatory because the conditions of human practice arise out of practice itself. (shrink)

The concept of second nature promises to provide an explanation of how nature and reason can be reconciled. But the concept is laden with ambiguity. On the one hand, second nature is understood as that which binds together all cognitive activities. On the other hand, second nature is conceived of as a kind of nature that can be changed by cognitive activities. The paper tries to investigate this ambiguity by distinguishing a Kantian conception of second nature from a Hegelian conception. (...) It argues that the idea of a transformation from a being of first nature into a being of second nature that stands at the heart of the Kantian conception is mistaken. The Hegelian conception demonstrates that the transformation in question takes place within second nature itself. Thus, the Hegelian conception allows us to understand the way in which second nature is not structurally isomorphic with first nature: It is a process of ongoing selftransformation that is not primarily determined by how the world is, but rather by commitments out of which human beings are bound to the open future. (shrink)

Franz Boas, the major founding figure of anthropology as a discipline of America, came to the United States from Germany in 1886. Though this fact is widely known, the significance of Boas' roots in German intellectual tradition and late nineteenth century German anthropology remains obscure. The essays in Volkgeist a Method and Ethic explore the Germanic influences on Boasian anthropology and clarify their implications for the ethnographic practice that Boas promulgated.

Opposition: Obedience and authority in Exodus 32-34 / George W. Coats -- The theological significance of contradiction within the Book of the Covenant / Paul D. Hanson -- The renewed authority of Old Testament wisdom for contemporary faith / Wayne Sibley Towner -- A stylistic study of the priestly creation story / Bernhard W. Anderson -- "I will not cause it to return" in Amos 1 and 2 / Rolf P. Knierim.

George W. S. Bailey. prove that mental phenomena in general are not self- intimating in sense (3). Armstrong's argument is based on two claims: (a) Introspective awareness and its objects are distinct existences. (b) If introspective awareness ...

The first English translation of Hegel's important lectures on logic.

This volume attempts a critical historical consideration of the varying colonial situations in which (and from which) ethnographic knowledge essential to anthropology has been produced. The essays cover regions from Oceania, Southeast Asia and southern Africa to North and South America.

The mother discipline of organisational behaviour has deep roots in psychology, particularly industrial and organisational psychology. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that new and theoretically incommensurate findings involving human moral behaviour have been met with calls for a more psychologically informed investigation of ethical behaviour in organisational contexts (DeCremer and Tenbrunsel, 2012; Reynolds and Ceranic, 2009). This project, aimed at a fuller understanding of the psychology of ethical behaviour, typically falls under the label of Organisational Ethical Behavior (OEB).

Continues the ongoing dialogue between religion and science. In this volume, the author has focused on scientific or science-based technology rather than just the significance of 'pure science'. This complex focus covers a number of issues including scientific theory, public policy, ethical consideration, cosmology, theological conundrums and the age-old issues of the meaning of human life and its fulfillment.

Les diverses formes de vie en commun appellent des modalités de reconnaissance très différentes. Mais il s'agit toujours de combats pour une insertion sociale réussie. Voici une tentative de déclinaison de la nature sociale de l'homme de façon à saisir les grammaires de l'humain comme les grammaires de la reconnaissance. Plusieurs articles en allemand et en anglais.

The thesis that art has ended is widespread in modernist philosophical aesthetics. Hegel and Arthur Danto are not the only ones to have claimed that art came to an end at some specific moment in history. The thesis of the end of art is intrinsic to the question of what art is. Danto is one of the most prominent proponents of the end‐of‐art thesis in recent debates in the philosophy of art. This chapter shows that both Hegel's and Danto's explanations (...) of what comes after the end of art allow us better to grasp some attributes essential to what art is. As for the highest vocation of art, Danto relies on a historical narrative according to which art is the first practice through which absolute spirit comes into existence. A key aspect of Danto's reading of Hegel's end‐of‐art thesis is that he understands it as a claim about a historical development. (shrink)

Philosophers who have a conception of morality that allows for an ultimate conflict between duty and self-interest inherit a most difficult problem: the problem of the unity of practical reason. As long as duty is thought of as an extension of self-interest, as apparently both Plato and Hobbes thought, no theoretical difficulty arises; practical reason is unified simply because duty and interest have the same goal. But once this kind of conceptual connection between duty and self-interest is severed, the task (...) is to avoid the philosophical nemesis of dualism, a conception of practical reason in which an individual’s choice between doing his duty and securing his interests is necessarily arbitrary as a matter of practical justification. Moreover, the difficulty is compounded when morality is conceived in such a way that a person has a morality only if his moral concerns have justificatory priority among his practical concerns. When built into the concept of morality, this sort of justificatory priority might initially appear to restore the unity lost by practical reason with the severance of duty and interest. But so achieved, the unity bears all the marks of having been gained arbitrarily, for it can just as plausibly be said that a person is an egoist only if his own interests take justificatory priority among his practical concerns. Faced then with a decision about what he ought to do in a situation in which duty and interest are in conflict, the practical reasoner confronts a dilemma. In trying to decide what he ought to do, practical reason, in the form of morality, advises him to do one thing, yet in the form of self-interest, it advises him to do another. Therefore, like Humpty Dumpty, once practical reason is shattered by the separation of duty and interest, the practical reasoner’s problem is how to put things back together again. (shrink)

13. The Normative Thoughts of Neighborly Love, Part 1.

If one wants to determine the relationship between ordinary life and art one has to start with the groundbreaking Kantian insight that the beautiful reflects the working of the human faculties of the understanding. However, I argue that the Kantian conception of aesthetic reflection is not satisfying, for Kant doesn’t succeed in explaining the objective purport of the aesthetic reflection. I resort to Hegel to resolve this problem. But his explanation, too, falls short of grasping the multiplicity of ways in (...) which works of art make a contribution to a self- determined way of life. However, in Hegel there is a hint how to deal with this problem: Re- flection has to be understood as practical and not as cognitive. A conception of aesthetic reflexivity in terms of practical self-determination allows grasping that there is no gap between ordinary life and art. (shrink)